{"id":9617,"date":"2018-09-01T06:42:09","date_gmt":"2018-09-01T06:42:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.inspirenignite.com\/jntuh\/?p=9617"},"modified":"2026-05-24T10:53:28","modified_gmt":"2026-05-24T05:23:28","slug":"jntuh-m-tech-2017-2018-r17-detailed-syllabus-game-theory","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.inspirenignite.com\/jntuh\/jntuh-m-tech-2017-2018-r17-detailed-syllabus-game-theory\/","title":{"rendered":"JNTUH M.Tech 2017-2018 (R17) Detailed Syllabus Game Theory"},"content":{"rendered":"Game Theory Detailed Syllabus for Computer Science and Engineering M.Tech first year first sem is covered here. This gives the details about credits, number of hours and other details along with reference books for the course.\r\n\r\nThe detailed syllabus for Game Theory M.Tech 2017-2018 (R17) first year first sem is as follows.\r\n\r\nM.Tech. I Year I Sem.\r\n\r\nUNIT – I: Introduction:<\/strong> Game Theory, Games and Solutions Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium, Rational Behavior, The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations, Bounded Rationality Terminology and Notation Nash Equilibrium- Strategic Games, Nash Equilibrium Examples Existence of a Nash Equilibrium, Strictly Competitive Games, Bayesian Games: Strategic Games with Imperfect Information\r\n\r\nUNIT – II: Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium<\/strong> -Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Correlated Equilibrium Evolutionary Equilibrium Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions-Rationalizability Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions, Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions\r\n\r\nUNIT – III: Knowledge and Equilibrium –<\/strong>A Model of Knowledge Common Knowledge, Can People Agree to Disagree? , Knowledge and Solution Concepts, The Electronic Mail Game\r\n\r\nUNIT – IV: Extensive Games with Perfect Information –<\/strong>Extensive Games with Perfect Information Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Two Extensions of the Definition of a Game The Interpretation of a Strategy , Two Notable Finite Horizon Games , Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies Bargaining Games -Bargaining and Game Theory , A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Variations and Extensions\r\n\r\nUNIT – V: Repeated Games –<\/strong> The Basic Idea Infinitely Repeated Games vs.\\ Finitely Repeated Games Infinitely Repeated Games: Definitions Strategies as Machines Trigger Strategies: Nash Folk Theorems Punishing for a Limited Length of Time: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion Punishing the Punisher: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Overtaking Criterion Rewarding Players Who Punish: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Discounting Criterion The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Discounting Criterion Finitely Repeated Game\r\n\r\nTEXT BOOKS:<\/strong>\r\n